This section of the Journal is primarily a report of cases in which the judiciary has attempted to do just that: delineate the rights and responsibilities of government entities and the public servants within those entities, including elected officials and career administrators. Cases reported here (alphabetically arranged by topic) were selected from among cases that the u.s. Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals published during approximately the past year. A government entity, officer or employee is a party in every case reported here. Cases were selected primarily for their impact on public servants and, hence, on the many members of the public whom those public workers are serving. Supreme Court opinions received priorityi lack of space precludes reporting more than a few decisions of the courts of appeals.
Administrative Procedure/ Exhaustion of Remedies Darby v. Cisneros 2 illustrates that in some instances a federal agency can delay or avoid being sued simply by requiring persons disputing an agency decision to follow certain agency-level dispute-resolution procedures. In Darby, an administrative law judge at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) suspended plaintiff (a real estate developer) from participating in any HUD procurement contracts and certain other transactions due to plaintiffs alleged misconduct in connection with certain HUD programs. Plaintiff asked the U.S. district GW Polley Perspectives 1994 court to review the administrative decision. Defendants, HUD and the Secretary of HOD, argued that plaintiff could not properly seek review in district court because plaintiff failed to utilize all means of obtaining review within the ,agency in a timely manner (i.e., "exhaust aClministrative remedies"). Specifically, defendants argued that plaintiff failed to ask the HUD Secretary to review the decision. The district court rejected HUD's argument but the court of appeals agreed with HOD and dismissed plaintiffs case. ' The Supreme Court then agreed to consider the matter.
The Supreme Court relied on the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),~ which generally provides for district court review of administrative rulings only after those rulings are final. Thus, to determine whether the plaintiff properly sought district court review, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the administrative decision was fmal. In making this determination, the Court applied an APA provisionS that states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented ... an application for ... reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court found that by this language Congress intended to delineate fully the requirement of administrative exhaustion of remedies and to preclude any additional judicially imposed requirement of administrative emaustion. 6 The administrative rule7 HUD relied on in its argument authorjzed plaintiff to seek further administrative review but did not reqUire him to do SOi thus, since plaintiff had the option to go to court without going further in the agency, the administrative law judge's decision (which had been entitled "Initial Decision and Order") was a fmal appealable administrative ruling.
Darby thus suggests that the wording of administrative regulations regarding administrative appeals often will detennine whether and when an agency is halled ~to court. Had HUD required, rather than just pennitted, plaintiff to seek further administrative review, HUD would have delayed, if not aVOided, being sued.
Americans with Disabilities Act
Several recent cases illustrate the pervasive impact that the Americans with Disabilities Act C"ADA")3 will continue to have on governmental budgetary and employeerelations decisions. Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health? highlights the broad class of persons deemed "disabled" under the ADA and Kinney v. Yernsalim'o demonstrates the extent to which states and localities must go to accommodate such individuals.
In Cook, plaintiff claimed that a state agency denied her employment because of her obesity. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied a definition of "disability" appearing in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 11 substantially similar to the ADNs definition. The court emphasized that even assuming that a "disability" must be unchangeable, obesity may still be a disability. The court also found that a "disability" can encompass a condition that a prospective employer merely perceives to be a disability,
In Kinney, disabled individuals claimed that regulations implementing the ADA require the City of Philadelphia to install curb ramps on any street in Philadelphia being resurfaced. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed and aff'inned the district court's ruling to that effect. The court of appeals' ruling illustrates the broad applicability of the ADA to municipal activities that may appear to be simple maintenance but that may affect a facility's "usability." 1he court focused on Section 227 of the ADA,12 which prOVides that when "altering" an existing facility used in providing public transportation, a public entity shall make the alteration in such a manner that the altered portio1l$ are readily usable by disabled individuals. The coua determined that an "alteration" is simply "a change . . . that affects or could affect the usability of the building or facility or part thereof."'! Citing a House Report on the ADA,14 the court asserted that "[u]sability should be broadly defined to include renovations which affect the use of a facility, and not simply changes which relate directly to access."IS
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Since resuxfacing a street affects the usability for everyone, resurfacing triggers the requirement that the street be made accessible to disabled persons. Further strengthening the dictates of the ADA, the court ruled that no "undue burden'"defense 16 is available with respect to alterations.
Apportionment(V0ting Rights
In Shaw v. Reno, 17 five white North Carolina residents challenged the Constitutionality of a Congressional districting (or "reapportionment") statute that the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged was "designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groupS."IB The white residents alleged that the plan created grossly distorted districts in order to separate voters by race and that this violated the Equal Protection Clause. The districts in question were created when the North Carolina legislature enacted the redistricting plan following the 1990 census which had revealed demographic changes, The legislature intended the plan to assure black minority voting power [A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause l221 may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though raceneutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into diffei:ent districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification,23
The Court did not explain what justification would be "sufficient," stating only that, when the case was sent back to the district court, if the inference of racial gerrymandering was uncontradicted, then the district court had to closely examine the statute to detennine whether the statute was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. If the statute was written to further such an interest, the law would be allowed to stand.
Because the Supreme Court generally addresses only those issues necessary to resolve a case, the Court declined to determine "whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged," and thUs expressed "no view" as to whether "'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection claim."2~ The Court's holding, in conjunction with the language about issues not reached, raises questions about the Constitutionality of reapportionment plans in other states that create districts along racial lines. In particular, the question arises as to which Constitutional test will be applied to an apportionment plan: (1) "strict scrutiny," requiring that a plan satisfy a compelling state interest in order to be valid; or (2) the "rationally related" test, where a plan is valid as long as it furthers a "legitimate" state interest. The question also arises as to when plaintiffs asserting an equal protection challenge to reapportionment legislation must establish that the challenged legislation has the "intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process. 
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Those decisions minimize the likelihood of such conflict by making clear that: (1) only under highly unusual conditions is racially based districting necessary in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and (2) the evidentiary burden of convincing the Court that such highly unusual conditions exist is immense. Accordingly, it is likely that in any case in which the Court finds that racially conscious districting runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court will also conclude that such racially conscious districting is unnecessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
In Growe, the Court considered a "single-member" legislative districting plan's alleged inconsistency with the Voting Rights Act. In a "single-member" districting plan, one legislator from a particular district serves in a particular state or local legislative entity (such as a state senate) at any given time. By contrast, in a multi-member districting plan, two or more legislators serve concurrently in the same state or local legislative entity. In Growe, the
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Court for the first time addressed a so-called "votefragmentation" c1aim-a claim that a racial minority group's ability to elect the legislator of the group's choice is thwarted by the manner in which the districts are conftgured. Z9 The Court took the opportunity to reafftnn the requirements for a successful Voting Rights Act challenge to a multi-member districting plan, and then applied those same requirements to challenges to a single-member districting plan.
The requirements for a successful Voting Rights Act challenge to a Congressional or legislative districting plan, as set forth in Growe, are: (1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single~member district, (2) that the minority group is politically coheSive, and (3) that Section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government A~ is overly broad as applied to executive branch employees and therefore violates the First Amendment.<IO Section SOl(b) prohibits the acceptance of "any honorarium" by a government officer, employee or member of Congress.
The court in National Treasury acknowledged that "the government has a strong interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of public service and in avoiding even the appearance of impr0p'riety created by abuse of the practice of receiving honoraria."4! The court recognized, however, that such interest must be balanced against the federal workers' First Amendment interests. The court concluded that the government's interest must be protected, if at all, through legislation that is narrow enough that a clear connection generally exists "between the employee's job and either the subject matter of the [banned] expression or the character of the payor."~2 Section SOl(b), in the court's view, was not sufficiently narrow. 43 Rather than declare the entire legislation void, however, the court ruled that the statute would be intexpreted in a manner that excluded executive branch employees. The court suggested that a Constitutional challenge to the statute as applied to legislative and judicial branch officers and employees "would raise quite different considerations."~ if a public official petforms his or her duties that involve discretion with careful regard for the rights of those affected by the exercise of those duties, then the public official will generally be safe from liability in lawsuits alleging that in petforming those duties the official violated an individual's civil rights. The Court stated that "in most cases" qualified immunity is sufficient "to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority."'! The Court recognized, however, that some officials p~r fonn "special functions" which, because of their similarity to functions that were absolutely immune when Sec. 1983 was enacted, deserve absolute protection from damages liability. The Court found that under some circumstances a criminal prosecutor does petfonn such special functions. The Court concluded that a prosecutor's activities in initiating a prosecution and presenting a state's case are absolutely immune, but that a prosecutor's "administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings" are entitled only to qualified immunity.,2 The Court found that the criminal prosecutor had only qualified immunity from liability for the two alleged acts of impropriety. Harbor agreed with a trades council that all successful bidders and subcontractors would, as a condition of being awarded a contract, agree to use only union labor. An organization representing nonunion employers sued, claiming that the NLRA precluded the state from such an "intrusion into the bargaining process."S?
The Court reaffirmed that in many respects the NLRA preempts state regulatory activity but found that the state here was acting as a business operator rather than a regulator. "Accordingly, the state was merely participating as a "proprietor" in the "free play of market forces" in an area that Congress, by its sUence, intentionally left to market forces: a determination of whether or not to require union labor. 
Separation of Powers
In Weiss v. U.S.,62 the u.s. Supreme Court demonstrated that the Court will give Congress broad latitude to determine whether executive or administrative tasks prescribed in legislation require the creation of a new public office, the holder of which must be confmned by the Senate, or instead can be assigned (by either the President or Congress) to a previously confmned public officer. In Weiss, individuals sentenced at courts-martial challenged the authority of the military trial and intennediate appellate judges to convict them, arguing that the method of appointing those judges violated the Appointments Clause. 63 The judges were selected by the Judge Advocate General of the NavyMarine Corps6" from a group of commissioned officers. The Supreme Court held that the selection method was consistent with Congressional intent and that, since the judges were selected'from among individuals whom the President had already nominated and the Senate had already confumed as commissioned officers, the selection method did not violate the AppOintments Clause.
The selection method for the military judges involved in Weiss had been administratively established rather than Congressionally specified. The Court, however, concluded that the method was consistent with Congressional intent in the absence of contrary statutory language, since "Congress has not hesitated to expressly require the separate appointment of military officers to certain posts," and since "[t]his difference negates any pennissible inference that Congress intended that military judges should receive a secon4 appointment, but in a fit of absentmindednessforgot to say so."~
The Court in Welss assumed and strongly suggested that military judges are "officers" subject to the Appointments Clause, rather than simply "employees," but stopped short of so stating, since the parties agreed on that point. 66 The
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Court then utilized a "gennaneness" test. This test was established in Shoemaker v. U.S,67 where the Court pennitted Congress to confer statutorily certain duties on an officer since the additional duties were "gennane" (closely related) to the position that the officer already held.
The Court concluded that "the role of military judge is 'gennane' to that of military officer,"OS and that therefore a military officer could be appointed military judge without further Senate confinnation. The Court did not, however, acknowledge any necessity of satisfying the "gennaneness"
test. The Court merely assumed for the sake of argument that the test applied. The Court noted that the purpose for judicially establishing the "germaneness" test was to assure that Congress does not circumvent the Appointments Clause by unilaterally appointing an incumbent to a new and distinct office. The Court found that since military judges are designated "from among hundreds or perhaps thousands of qualified commissioned officers," there is "no ground for suspicion here that Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a particular individual to fill the office."69
The breadth of the judicial interpretation of "geffilaneness" suggests the extremely broad latitude that the Court may give both Congress and the executive branch to designate additional tasks for "officers" both within and outside the military. ('The "gennaneness" test is not limited to military cases.) The latitude may be larger still if the Court did mean to suggest that "gennaneness" need not be satisfied when Congress authorizes the executive branch to designate, from among current "officers," individuals to perfonn certain Congressionally prescribed tasks. 
